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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Domestic Relations-Illegitimates--Father's Duty to Support
In the recent North Carolina case of Allen v.Hunnicutt1 it was held,
in effect, that an illegitimate child may not compel its father to furnish
it support by means of a civil action, but that only by the procedure
outlined in the "bastardy" statute2 may the child enforce "such rights
as it may have" 3 against the putative father.
The direct question presented in Allen v. Hunnicutt has rarely confronted the courts. In Alabama and Virginia it has been ruled that
without express statutory authorization an illegitimate may not maintain a civil suit for support against its putative father.4 But in Kansas
the common law rule which denies that the father has any duty to support his illegitimate child has been changed, the bastardy statute held
to provide an inadequate remedy, and a civil action by the child
permitted. 5
The problem has often received the indirect consideration of the
courts, and the frequent reassertion of the common law rule doubtless
explains the infrequence of cases contesting the possibility of a civil
suit by the child. Cases abound commenting that the father has no6
duty to support his illegitimate children except as provided by statute,
that such statutes are to be strictly construed,7 and that the rights and
remedies they provide are exclusive.8
In North Carolina the disparity between legitimate and illegitimate
children with respect to support and maintenance is striking. The
1230 N. C. 49, 52 S. E. 2d 18 (1949).

2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§49-1 through 49-4 (1943). The term "bastardy" statute
is misleading, bastardy being the mere begetting of an illegitimate child. Bastardy.
alone is no crime in North Carolina; there must be in addition willful non-support
of the child. State v. Bowser, 230 N. C. 330, 53 S. E. 2d 282 (1949) ; State v.
Stiles, 228 N. C. 137, 44 S.E. 2d 728 (1947).
'In the absence of contract, the child's only right to support from its putative
father is that created by the bastardy statute. See discussion, post.
'Simmons v. Bull, 21 Ala. 501, 56 Am. Dec. 257 (1852); Brown v. Brown,
183 Va. 353, 32 S.E. 2d 79 (1944).
Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923) ; amplified in Myers
v. Anderson, 145 Kan. 775, 67 P. 2d 542 (1937).
'Albanese v. Richter, 67 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. N. J.1946) ; Law v. State, 238
Ala. 428, 191 So. 803 (1939; Myers v. Harrington, 70 Cal. App. 680, 234 Pac.
412 (1925); Washington v. Martin, 75 Ga. App. 466, 43 S. E. 2d 590 (1947);
State v. Lindskog, 175 Minn. 533, 221 N. W. 911 (1928) ; State v. Porterfield, 222
Mo. App. 553, 292 S.W. 85 (1927) ; Carlson v. Bartels, 143 Neb. 680, 10 N. W.
2d 671 (1943) ; Wynder v. Daniels, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 314 (1947) ; State v. Zimmerman, 67 Ohio App. 272, 36 N. E. 2d 808 (1941) ; State v. Boston, 69 Okla. Crim.
307, 102 P. 2d 889 (1940); Kordoski v. Belanger, 52 R. I. 268, 160 Atl. 205
(1932); Beaver v. State, 96 Tex. Crim. 179, 256 S. W. 929 (1923); Brown v.
Brown, 183 Va. 353, 32 S.E. 2d 79 (1944). For collection of cases prior to 1923,
see 7Note, 30 A. L. R. 1069 (1924).
Albanese v. Richter; Washington v. Martin; State v. Lindskog; Wynder v.
Daniels; State v. Zimmerman; supra note 6. For collection of cases prior to 1923,
see Note, 30 A. L. R. 1069 (1924).
' State v. Lindskog; Wynder v. Daniels; State v. Boston; Brown v. Brown;
supra note 7. For collection of cases prior to 1923, see Note, 30 A. L. R. 1069
(1924).
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father is charged with primary liability for the support of his legitimate
children, whether or not they have property, 10 and the duty is said to
exist until the child reaches twenty-one, at least,1' unless there has been
a complete emancipation by mutual assent.' 2 His liability is not affected
by divorce, even though the mother is awarded custody.' 3 The duty
may be enforced in a civil suit brought by the mother 14 or by the child, 1r
or by motion in the cause by a divorced wife ;1 and criminal penalties
are provided for its breach.' 7 On the other hand, in the absence of
contract' 8 the illegitimate child's only right to support from its father
is that created by the bastardy statute.' 9 The only means for enforcing
this right is by criminal prosecution 2 0 which may be instituted by the
mother or her representative, or the superintendent of public welfare
(if the child is likely to become a public charge), but apparently not by
the child itself. 21 The father's duty terminates when the child reaches
fourteen, and may terminate when it reaches three.22 In the litigation,
the child is seriously handicapped. Every element-paternity, non23
support, and willfulness-must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the right to appeal is denied except as granted to the state in other
24
criminal cases.
At early English common law, the illegitimate was a stranger to its
'Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C.614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947) ; Note, 26 N. C. L. REv.
202 (1948).

10 Burke v. Turner, 85 N. C. 500, 504 (1881) ; Haglar v. McCombs, 66 N. C.
346, 351 (1872) ; Walker v. Crowder, 37 N. C. 478, 487 (1843).
" Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947).
12 Honycutt v. Thompson, 159 N. C. 29, 74 S. E. 628 (1912).
For what constitutes mutual assent, see James v. James, 226 N. C. 399, 38 S. E. 2d 168 (1946).

Mutual assent is not required if the child marries or enlists in the armed services,
the new relationship being inconsistent with the continuance of the parent-child
relationship.
13 Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936) ; Sanders v. Sanders,
167 N. C. 319, 83 S. E. 490 (1914).
"45 Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947).
" Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936).
"Winfield v. Winfield, 228 N. C. 256, 45 S. E. 2d 259 (1947).
1N.
C. GEN. STAT. §14-322 (1943), as amended by N. C. Sess. Laws 1949,

c. 810; N. C.

GEN. STAT.

§14-325 (1943).

Regarding the father's contract to support his illegitimate child, see Conley
v. Cabe, 198 N. C. 298, 151 S. E. 645 (1930) ; Redmon v. Roberts, 198 N. C. 161,
150 S. E. 881 (1929) ; Thayer v. Thayer, 189 N. C. 502, 127 S. E. 553 (1925).
1

10 Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N. C. 49, 52 S. E. 2d 18 (1949).
And even ths
right was created incidentally, said the court, the purpose of the statute being

to prevent illegitimates from becoming public charges.
20 Allen v. Hunnicutt, supra note 19.
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. §49-5 (1943) seems to be exclusive, but the point has not
yet been decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
" N. C. GEN. SrAT. §49-4 (1943), as revised by N. C. Sess. Laws 1945, c.
1053.
" State v. Ellison, 230 N. C. 59, 52 S. E. 2d 9 (1949) ; State v. Spillman, 210
N. C. 271, 186 S. E. 322 (1936); State v. Cook, 207 N. C. 261, 176 S. E. 757
(1934).
'4 State v. Morris, 208 N. C. 44, 179 S. E. 19 (1935).
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parents, neither owing it any duty of support. 25 In most jurisdictions
26
today the courts have imposed a non-statutory duty upon the mother.
But the common law rule as to the father has been altered by judicial
27
action in only one state.
To mitigate the harshness of the common law, legislation has been
enacted in almost every state, affording various means of compelling
the father to contribute to the support of his illegitimate child. A great
many states have adopted bastardy laws somewhat similiar to those in
North Carolina.2 8 The action is usually civil in nature, though brought
in the name of the state, and usually is instituted by the mother, or by
the public authorities. Trial by jury is almost universal, and the mother
is always a competent witness. North Carolina seems to be unique in
making willful non-support an essential element; in other states the only
issue is the question of paternity. The consequence of "conviction" is
an order to support the child, enforceable by imprisonment, contempt
proceedings, and attachment levied under execution. Often provision
is made for release from prison after taking the pauper's oath.
Eight states have adopted variously modified versions of the Uniform Illegitimacy Act.29 This act in detail imposes upon both parents
2 Murrell v. Industrial Commission, 291 Il. 334, 126 N. E. 189 (1920);
Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923); State v. Tieman, 32
Wash. 294, 73 Pac. 375 (1903). A few cases have indicated an opinion that at
common law the mother has always had the responsibility of maintaining her
child. State v. Porterfield, 222 Mo. App. 553, 292 S. W. 85 (1927).
2 Davis v. Herrington, 53 Ark. 5, 13 S. W. 215 (1890) ; Beckett v. State, 5
Ind. App. 136, 30 N. E. 536 (1892) ; State v. Porterfield, supra note 25; Jaffe v.
Deckard, 261 S. W. 390, 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). It has been held, however,
that in the absence of statute neither parent has the duty of support. Murrell v.
Industrial Commission, supra note 25.
27 Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).
In Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. 2d 621 (1934) the court used language suggesting that
had not the legislature already legitimatized all children, it might have followed
Doughty v. Engler and changed the common law in Arizona.
8 ALA. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, §§1 et seq. (1940); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§34-701 et
seq. (1947) ; COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 20, §§1 et seq., c. 83, §§1 et seq. (1935) ; CONN.
Ry. GEN. STAT. §§8178 et seq. (1949); DEL. REV. CODE §§3558 et seq. (1935);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§74201 et seq. (1944); GA. CODE ANN. §§74-301 et seq. (1935);
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 17, §§1 et seq. (1934) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§62-2301 et
seq. (1935) ; Kxy. REv. STAT. §§406-010 et seq. (1948) ; ME. REv. STAT. c. 153,
§§23 et seq. (1944); Mn. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 12, §§1 et seq. (1939);
MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 273, §§11 et seq. (1932); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§25.451 et
seq. (Henderson 1937) ; MINN. STAT. §§257.18 et seq. (Henderson 1945) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. §§383 et seq. (1942) ; MONT. REv. CODE ANN. §§12267 et seq. (1935) ;
N. H. REv. LAWS c. 128, §§1 et seq. (1942) ; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN §§12110 et
seq. (1938); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§71 et seq. (1936); ORE. ComP. LAWS
ANN. §§28-901 et seq. (1940) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4732 (1945) ; R. I. GEN.
LAWS c. 424, §§1 et seq. (1938) ; S. C. CODE ANN. §§1726 et seq. (1942) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. §11936 (Williams 1934) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§14-2-1 et seq. (1943) ;
VT. STAT. §§3265 et seq. (1947) ; WASu. REV. STAT. ANN. §§1970 et seq. (1931) ;
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§4770 et seq. (1943); Wis. STAT. §§166.01 et seq. (1947).
2" IN . ANN. STAT. §§3-623 et seq. (Bums 1933); IOWA CODE §§675.1 et seq.
(1949) ; Nmv. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§3405 etseq. (1929); N. M. STAT. ANN. §§25-401
et seq. (1941); N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§119 et seq. (1941); N. D. Ray. CODE
§§32-3601 et seq. (1943) ; S. D.
ANN. §§58-401 et seq. (1945).

CODE

§§37.2101 et seq. (1939) ; Wyo. Comp.

STAT.
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the duty to support their illegitimate children, enabling the mother ol
third parties to maintain a civil action against the putative father to
force him to contribute to support, or to recover for support furnished.
Liability is extended to the father's estate under certain conditions. The
act contains full and effective means for enforcing the father's duty,
and is well adapted to meet the problem of the absconding father.
Broad statutory duties are imposed in California and New Jersey. 30
In Louisiana the statute says that fathers owe "alimony" to their illegitimate children "when they are in need."3 1 In Nebraska the father has
the same duty as if the children were legitimate, after paternity has
been judicially established.3 2 And in Arizona every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and education
33
as if born in lawful wedlock.
Modern conceptions of social obligations are far advanced from
those in the days when the common law was formulated. A reexamination of the basic considerations underlying the discrimination
between legitimate and illegitimate children would not seem inappropriate. Various arguments have been advanced in support of the common
law rule.. It has been said that "the reason for the rule that the putative
father could not be made to support his bastard child was the uncertainty of its paternity. '34 The difficulty of establishing fatherhood is
recognized. The question of what degree of proof should be required
and what evidence should be admissible is not within the scope of this
note; but once paternity has been established, the difficulty of doing so
seems an unsatisfactory basis for further discrimination.
It has been argued that the policy of discrimination between illegitimate and legitimate children fosters the institution of marriage, and
serves as a deterrent to illicit cohabitation. 35 If so, its effect has been
negligible. 36 Logic reasons and experience demonstrate that a more
likely stimulus would be provided by direct action against the offenders.
Perhaps it was supposed that vicarious suffering would torture the conscience of the wrongdoers. But to punish innocent children, on the
unreasonable hope that their suffering would touch the unscrupulous
heart, would seem a rather barbarous way of enforcing social concepts.
"CAL. CiV. CODE §196a (1941); N. J. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§16-1 et seq.
(1939).

"LA.

Cir. CODE

AN.

art. 202 through 212, art. 238 through 245 (1945).

"NEB. REv. STAT. §§13-101 et seq. (1943).
"AIz. CODE ANN. §§27-401 et seq. (1939).
" Jaffe v. Deckard (Tex. Civ. App.), 261 S. W. 390, 397 (1924) ; Kimbrough
v. Davis, 16 N. C. 71, 76 (1827).
" Flintham v. Holder, 16 N. C. 345, 348 (1829).

" The North Carolina Bureau of Vital Statistics reports that in 1948 there

were 108,834 births reported, 8,254 of which were illegitimate. 7.58 percent of
the children born in 1948 were illegitimate at birth. This figure does not include children of marriages which are void ipso facto, or declared void ab initio,

nor those children who are later bastardized by proof of non-access of the husband.
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It has been argued that the duty to support grows out of the marital
relation, not out of parentage. If so, it is difficult to see why the burden
of support is cast upon the unwed mother. North Carolina holds that the
duty to support legitimate children is the natural consequence of parenthood, and arises from the mere act of bringing the child into the world
unable to care for itself.3 7 This reasoning is equally applicable to illegitimate children. As the Kansas court said in Doughty v. Engler,38 "A
sufficient reason for holding parents to be under a legal obligation, apart
from any statute, to support their legitimate child while it is too young
to care for itself, is that the liability ought to attach as a part of their
responsibility for having brought it into being, If that reason is not
found convincing it would be useless to seek others; and it does not in
the least depend for its force upon the fact that the parents were married to each other."
Finally, it has been suggested that the duty to support is the reciprocal of the right to custody.3 9 This view has been expressly
repudiated by some courts. 40 The duty to support one's children should
be regarded as part of the responsibility of parenthood, not as the price
the parent must pay for custody.41
Aside from its logical inconsistency and its injustice to the child,
the systematic discrimination which characterizes our legislative policy
toward illegitimates is seriously detrimental to the public welfare.
Economically it is a policy which tends to pauperize North Carolina
citizens. Socially we have added to inevitable ridicule and ostracism,
legal burdens and disadvantages more likely to create menaces to, than
useful members of, society. It is submitted that the responsibility for
having brought the illegitimate child into being, coupled with its inability to care for itself, constitute sufficient reasons for imposing upon
both parents the duty of supporting it.
LLOYD S. ELKINS, JR.

"Wells v. Wells, 227 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 2d 31 (1947) ; accord, Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. 2d 621 (1934); Doughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211
Pac. 619 (1923); Buckninster v. Buckminster, 38 Vt. 248, 88 Am. Dec. 652

(1865).

" 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).
So Jaffe v. Deckard (Tex. Civ. App.), 261 S. W. 390, 397 (1924) ; see Doughty
v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).
" Barrett v. Barrett, 44 Ariz. 509, 39 P. 2d 621 (1934) ("'We believe that the
enlightened legal concept of the present day is that parentage in and of itself

imposes a legal duty of support to minor children."); Gibson v. Gibson, 18 Wash.
489, 51 Pac. 1041 (1898).

"'It will be noted that in North Carolina when the mother is awarded the cus-

tody of legitimate children in a divorce action, the father's primary liability for
their support is unaffected. Green v. Green, 210 N. C. 147, 185 S. E. 651 (1936).

